In the brain, the insular cortex receives a vast amount of interoceptive information, ascending through deep brain structures, from multiple visceral organs. The unique hierarchical and modular architecture of the insula suggests specialization for processing interoceptive afferents. Yet, the biological significance of the insula's neuroanatomical architecture, in relation to deep brain structures, remains obscure. In this opinion piece, we propose the Insula Hierarchical Modular Adaptive Interoception Control (IMAC) model to suggest that insula modules (granular, dysgranular and agranular), forming parallel networks with the prefrontal cortex and striatum, are specialized to form higher order interoceptive representations. These interoceptive representations are recruited in a context-dependent manner to support habitual, model-based and exploratory control of visceral organs and physiological processes. We discuss how insula interoceptive representations may give rise to conscious feelings that best explain lower order deep brain interoceptive representations, and how the insula may serve to defend the body and mind against pathological depression. <<<

The positive-negative axis of emotional valence has long been recognized as fundamental to adaptive behavior, but its origin and underlying function have largely eluded formal theorizing and computational modeling. Using deep active inference, a hierarchical inference scheme that rests on inverting a model of how sensory data are generated, we develop a principled Bayesian model of emotional valence. This formulation asserts that agents infer their valence state based on the expected precision of their action model-an internal estimate of overall model fitness ("subjective fitness"). This index of subjective fitness can be estimated within any environment and exploits the domain generality of second-order beliefs (beliefs about beliefs). We show how maintaining internal valence representations allows the ensuing affective agent to optimize confidence in action selection preemptively. Valence representations can in turn be optimized by leveraging the (Bayes-optimal) updating term for subjective fitness, which we label affective charge (AC). AC tracks changes in fitness estimates and lends a sign to otherwise unsigned divergences between predictions and outcomes. We simulate the resulting affective inference by subjecting an in silico affective agent to a T-maze paradigm requiring context learning, followed by context reversal. This formulation of affective inference offers a principled account of the link between affect, (mental) action, and implicit metacognition. It characterizes how a deep biological system can infer its affective state and reduce uncertainty about such inferences through internal action (i.e., top-down modulation of priors that underwrite confidence). Thus, we demonstrate the potential of active inference to provide a formal and computationally tractable account of affect. Our demonstration of the face validity and potential utility of this formulation represents the first step within a larger research program. Next, this model can be leveraged to test the hypothesized role of valence by fitting the model to behavioral and neuronal responses. <<<

Over the last 10 to 15 years, active inference has helped to explain various brain mechanisms from habit formation to dopaminergic discharge and even modelling curiosity. However, the current implementations suffer from an exponential (space and time) complexity class when computing the prior over all the possible policies up to the time-horizon. Fountas et al. (2020) used Monte Carlo tree search to address this problem, leading to impressive results in two different tasks. In this paper, we present an alternative framework that aims to unify tree search and active inference by casting planning as a structure learning problem. Two tree search algorithms are then presented. The first propagates the expected free energy forward in time (i.e., towards the leaves), while the second propagates it backward (i.e., towards the root). Then, we demonstrate that forward and backward propagations are related to active inference and sophisticated inference, respectively, thereby clarifying the differences between those two planning strategies. <<<

Ten years into the revival of deep networks and artificial intelligence, we propose a theoretical framework that sheds light on understanding deep networks within a bigger picture of Intelligence in general. We introduce two fundamental principles, Parsimony and Self-consistency, that address two fundamental questions regarding Intelligence: what to learn and how to learn, respectively. We believe the two principles are the cornerstones for the emergence of Intelligence, artificial or natural. While these two principles have rich classical roots, we argue that they can be stated anew in entirely measurable and computable ways. More specifically, the two principles lead to an effective and efficient computational framework, compressive closed-loop transcription, that unifies and explains the evolution of modern deep networks and many artificial intelligence practices. While we mainly use modeling of visual data as an example, we believe the two principles will unify understanding of broad families of autonomous intelligent systems and provide a framework for understanding the brain. <<<

One of the most salient features of life is its capacity to handle novelty and namely to thrive and adapt to new circumstances and changes in both the environment and internal components. An understanding of this capacity is central to several fields: the evolution of form and function, the design of effective strategies for biomedicine, and the creation of novel life forms via chimeric and bioengineering technologies. Here, we review instructive examples of living organisms solving diverse problems and propose competent navigation in arbitrary spaces as an invariant for thinking about the scaling of cognition during evolution. We argue that our innate capacity to recognize agency and intelligence in unfamiliar guises lags far behind our ability to detect it in familiar behavioral contexts. The multi-scale competency of life is essential to adaptive function, potentiating evolution and providing strategies for top-down control (not micromanagement) to address complex disease and injury. We propose an observer-focused viewpoint that is agnostic about scale and implementation, illustrating how evolution pivoted similar strategies to explore and exploit metabolic, transcriptional, morphological, and finally 3D motion spaces. By generalizing the concept of behavior, we gain novel perspectives on evolution, strategies for system-level biomedical interventions, and the construction of bioengineered intelligences. This framework is a first step toward relating to intelligence in highly unfamiliar embodiments, which will be essential for progress in artificial intelligence and regenerative medicine and for thriving in a world increasingly populated by synthetic, bio-robotic, and hybrid beings. <<<

Within computational neuroscience, the algorithmic and neural basis of structure learning remains poorly understood. Concept learning is one primary example, which requires both a type of internal model expansion process (adding novel hidden states that explain new observations), and a model reduction process (merging different states into one underlying cause and thus reducing model complexity via meta-learning). Although various algorithmic models of concept learning have been proposed within machine learning and cognitive science, many are limited to various degrees by an inability to generalize, the need for very large amounts of training data, and/or insufficiently established biological plausibility. Using concept learning as an example case, we introduce a novel approach for modeling structure learning-and specifically state-space expansion and reduction-within the active inference framework and its accompanying neural process theory. Our aim is to demonstrate its potential to facilitate a novel line of active inference research in this area. The approach we lay out is based on the idea that a generative model can be equipped with extra (hidden state or cause) "slots" that can be engaged when an agent learns about novel concepts. This can be combined with a Bayesian model reduction process, in which any concept learning-associated with these slots-can be reset in favor of a simpler model with higher model evidence. We use simulations to illustrate this model's ability to add new concepts to its state space (with relatively few observations) and increase the granularity of the concepts it currently possesses. We also simulate the predicted neural basis of these processes. We further show that it can accomplish a simple form of "one-shot" generalization to new stimuli. Although deliberately simple, these simulation results highlight ways in which active inference could offer useful resources in developing neurocomputational models of structure learning. They provide a template for how future active inference research could apply this approach to real-world structure learning problems and assess the added utility it may offer. <<<

Understanding information processing in the brain-and creating general-purpose artificial intelligence-are long-standing aspirations of scientists and engineers worldwide. The distinctive features of human intelligence are high-level cognition and control in various interactions with the world including the self, which are not defined in advance and are vary over time. The challenge of building human-like intelligent machines, as well as progress in brain science and behavioural analyses, robotics, and their associated theoretical formalisations, speaks to the importance of the world-model learning and inference. In this article, after briefly surveying the history and challenges of internal model learning and probabilistic learning, we introduce the free energy principle, which provides a useful framework within which to consider neuronal computation and probabilistic world models. Next, we showcase examples of human behaviour and cognition explained under that principle. We then describe symbol emergence in the context of probabilistic modelling, as a topic at the frontiers of cognitive robotics. Lastly, we review recent progress in creating human-like intelligence by using novel probabilistic programming languages. The striking consensus that emerges from these studies is that probabilistic descriptions of learning and inference are powerful and effective ways to create human-like artificial intelligent machines and to understand intelligence in the context of how humans interact with their world. <<<

Conceptual and mathematical models of neurons have lagged behind empirical understanding for decades. Here we extend previous work in modeling biological systems with fully scale-independent quantum information-theoretic tools to develop a uniform, scalable representation of synapses, dendritic and axonal processes, neurons, and local networks of neurons. In this representation, hierarchies of quantum reference frames act as hierarchical active-inference systems. The resulting model enables specific predictions of correlations between synaptic activity, dendritic remodeling, and trophic reward. We summarize how the model may be generalized to nonneural cells and tissues in developmental and regenerative contexts. <<<

Central to the study of cognition is being able to specify the Subject that is making decisions and owning memories and preferences. However, all real cognitive agents are made of parts (such as brains made of cells). The integration of many active subunits into a coherent Self appearing at a larger scale of organization is one of the fundamental questions of evolutionary cognitive science. Typical biological model systems, whether basal or advanced, have a static anatomical structure which obscures important aspects of the mind-body relationship. Recent advances in bioengineering now make it possible to assemble, disassemble, and recombine biological structures at the cell, organ, and whole organism levels. Regenerative biology and controlled chimerism reveal that studies of cognition in intact, "standard", evolved animal bodies are just a narrow slice of a much bigger and as-yet largely unexplored reality: the incredible plasticity of dynamic morphogenesis of biological forms that house and support diverse types of cognition. The ability to produce living organisms in novel configurations makes clear that traditional concepts, such as body, organism, genetic lineage, death, and memory are not as well-defined as commonly thought, and need considerable revision to account for the possible spectrum of living entities. Here, I review fascinating examples of experimental biology illustrating that the boundaries demarcating somatic and cognitive Selves are fluid, providing an opportunity to sharpen inquiries about how evolution exploits physical forces for multi-scale cognition. Developmental (pre-neural) bioelectricity contributes a novel perspective on how the dynamic control of growth and form of the body evolved into sophisticated cognitive capabilities. Most importantly, the development of functional biobots - synthetic living machines with behavioral capacity - provides a roadmap for greatly expanding our understanding of the origin and capacities of cognition in all of its possible material implementations, especially those that emerge de novo, with no lengthy evolutionary history of matching behavioral programs to bodyplan. Viewing fundamental questions through the lens of new, constructed living forms will have diverse impacts, not only in basic evolutionary biology and cognitive science, but also in regenerative medicine of the brain and in artificial intelligence. <<<

Theories of consciousness and cognition that assume a neural substrate automatically regard phylogenetically basal, nonneural systems as nonconscious and noncognitive. Here, we advance a scale-free characterization of consciousness and cognition that regards basal systems, including synthetic constructs, as not only informative about the structure and function of experience in more complex systems but also as offering distinct advantages for experimental manipulation. Our "minimal physicalist" approach makes no assumptions beyond those of quantum information theory, and hence is applicable from the molecular scale upwards. We show that standard concepts including integrated information, state broadcasting via small-world networks, and hierarchical Bayesian inference emerge naturally in this setting, and that common phenomena including stigmergic memory, perceptual coarse-graining, and attention switching follow directly from the thermodynamic requirements of classical computation. We show that the self-representation that lies at the heart of human autonoetic awareness can be traced as far back as, and serves the same basic functions as, the stress response in bacteria and other basal systems. <<<

The Free Energy Principle (FEP) states that under suitable conditions of weak coupling, random dynamical systems with sufficient degrees of freedom will behave so as to minimize an upper bound, formalized as a variational free energy, on surprisal (a.k.a., self-information). This upper bound can be read as a Bayesian prediction error. Equivalently, its negative is a lower bound on Bayesian model evidence (a.k.a., marginal likelihood). In short, certain random dynamical systems evince a kind of self-evidencing. Here, we reformulate the FEP in the formal setting of spacetime-background free, scale-free quantum information theory. We show how generic quantum systems can be regarded as observers, which with the standard freedom of choice assumption become agents capable of assigning semantics to observational outcomes. We show how such agents minimize Bayesian prediction error in environments characterized by uncertainty, insufficient learning, and quantum contextuality. We show that in its quantum-theoretic formulation, the FEP is asymptotically equivalent to the Principle of Unitarity. Based on these results, we suggest that biological systems employ quantum coherence as a computational resource and - implicitly - as a communication resource. We summarize a number of problems for future research, particularly involving the resources required for classical communication and for detecting and responding to quantum context switches. <<<

AbstractActive inference offers a unified theory of perception, learning, and decision-making at computational and neural levels of description. In this article, we address the worry that active inference may be in tension with the belief–desire–intention (BDI) model within folk psychology because it does not include terms for desires (or other conative constructs) at the mathematical level of description. To resolve this concern, we first provide a brief review of the historical progression from predictive coding to active inference, enabling us to distinguish between active inference formulations of motor control (which need not have desires under folk psychology) and active inference formulations of decision processes (which do have desires within folk psychology). We then show that, despite a superficial tension when viewed at the mathematical level of description, the active inference formalism contains terms that are readily identifiable as encoding both the objects of desire and the strength of desire at the psychological level of description. We demonstrate this with simple simulations of an active inference agent motivated to leave a dark room for different reasons. Despite their consistency, we further show how active inference may increase the granularity of folk-psychological descriptions by highlighting distinctions between drives to seek information versus reward—and how it may also offer more precise, quantitative folk-psychological predictions. Finally, we consider how the implicitly conative components of active inference may have partial analogues (i.e., “as if” desires) in other systems describable by the broader free energy principle to which it conforms. <<<

The active inference framework, and in particular its recent formulation as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), has gained increasing popularity in recent years as a useful approach for modeling neurocognitive processes. This framework is highly general and flexible in its ability to be customized to model any cognitive process, as well as simulate predicted neuronal responses based on its accompanying neural process theory. It also affords both simulation experiments for proof of principle and behavioral modeling for empirical studies. However, there are limited resources that explain how to build and run these models in practice, which limits their widespread use. Most introductions assume a technical background in programming, mathematics, and machine learning. In this paper we offer a step-by-step tutorial on how to build POMDPs, run simulations using standard MATLAB routines, and fit these models to empirical data. We assume a minimal background in programming and mathematics, thoroughly explain all equations, and provide exemplar scripts that can be customized for both theoretical and empirical studies. Our goal is to provide the reader with the requisite background knowledge and practical tools to apply active inference to their own research. We also provide optional technical sections and multiple appendices, which offer the interested reader additional technical details. This tutorial should provide the reader with all the tools necessary to use these models and to follow emerging advances in active inference research. <<<

Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018; Hohwy and Seth 2020). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research. <<<

Characterizing consciousness in and of itself is notoriously difficult. Any effort to define consciousness seems to evade what it tries to achieve. In particular, definitions often involve comparisons of different kinds of “consciousness” in a self-referential manner. The tautological nature of characterizing consciousness has led some scholars to propose that establishing a science of consciousness is infeasible. Here, we propose an alternative approach to characterize, and to eventually define, consciousness through exhaustive descriptions of consciousness’ relationships to all other consciousness. This approach is mathematically founded in category theory. Indeed, category theory can prove two objects A and B in a category can be equivalent if and only if all the relationships that A holds with others in the category are the same as those of B; this proof is called the Yoneda lemma. To introduce the Yoneda lemma, we gradually introduce key concepts of category theory to consciousness researchers in this paper. Along the way, we propose several possible definitions of categories of consciousness, both in terms of level and contents, through the usage of simple examples. We also propose empirical research programs that can test the validity of our proposed categories of consciousness and to improve them. We propose to use the categorical structure of consciousness as a gold standard if one tries to empirically test some structural theories of consciousness, such as Integrated Information Theory of consciousness. <<<

Maxwell J D Ramstead, Anil K Seth, Casper Hesp, Lars Sandved-Smith, Jonas Mago, Michael Lifshitz, Giuseppe Pagnoni, Ryan Smith, Guillaume Dumas, Antoine Lutz, Karl Friston, Axel Constant <<<

This paper presents a version of neurophenomenology based on generative modelling techniques developed in computational neuroscience and biology. Our approach can be described as because it applies methods originally developed in computational modelling to provide a formal model of the descriptions of lived experience in the phenomenological tradition of philosophy (e.g., the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, etc.). The first section presents a brief review of the overall project to naturalize phenomenology. The second section presents and evaluates philosophical objections to that project and situates our version of computational phenomenology with respect to these projects. The third section reviews the generative modelling framework. The final section presents our approach in detail. We conclude by discussing how our approach differs from previous attempts to use generative modelling to help understand consciousness. In summary, we describe a version of computational phenomenology which uses generative modelling to construct a computational model of the inferential or interpretive processes that best explain this or that kind of lived experience. <<<

In recent years, scientists have increasingly taken to investigate the predictive nature of cognition. We argue that prediction relies on abstraction, and thus theories of predictive cognition need an explicit theory of abstract representation. We propose such a theory of the abstract representational capacities that allow humans to transcend the "here-and-now." Consistent with the predictive cognition literature, we suggest that the representational substrates of the mind are built as a hierarchy, ranging from the concrete to the abstract; however, we argue that there are qualitative differences between elements along this hierarchy, generating meaningful, often unacknowledged, diversity. Echoing views from philosophy, we suggest that the representational hierarchy can be parsed into: modality-specific representations, instantiated on perceptual similarity; multimodal representations, instantiated primarily on the discovery of spatiotemporal contiguity; and categorical representations, instantiated primarily on social interaction. These elements serve as the building blocks of complex structures discussed in cognitive psychology (e.g., episodes, scripts) and are the inputs for mental representations that behave like functions, typically discussed in linguistics (i.e., predicators). We support our argument for representational diversity by explaining how the elements in our ontology are all required to account for humans' predictive cognition (e.g., in subserving logic-based prediction; in optimizing the trade-off between accurate and detailed predictions) and by examining how the neuroscientific evidence coheres with our account. In doing so, we provide a testable model of the neural bases of conceptual cognition and highlight several important implications to research on self-projection, reinforcement learning, and predictive-processing models of psychopathology. <<<

基于物理信息的神经网络(Physics-informed Neural Networks,PINN),是一类用于解决有监督学习任务的神经网络,它不仅尽力遵循训练数据样本的分布规律,而且遵守由偏微分方程描述的物理定律。与纯数据驱动的神经网络学习相比,PINN在训练过程中施加了物理信息约束,因此能用更少的数据样本学习得到更具泛化能力的模型。近年来,PINN已逐渐成为机器学习和计算数学交叉学科的研究热点,并在理论和应用方面都获得了相对深入的研究,取得了可观的进展。但PINN独特的网络结构在实际应用中也存在训练缓慢甚至不收敛、精度低等问题。文中在总结当前PINN研究的基础上,对其网络/体系设计及其在流体力学等多个领域中的应用进行了探究,并展望了进一步的研究方向。 <<<

In the context of science, the well-known adage "a picture is worth a thousand words" might well be "a model is worth a thousand datasets." In this manuscript we introduce the SciML software ecosystem as a tool for mixing the information of physical laws and scientific models with data-driven machine learning approaches. We describe a mathematical object, which we denote universal differential equations (UDEs), as the unifying framework connecting the ecosystem. We show how a wide variety of applications, from automatically discovering biological mechanisms to solving high-dimensional Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations, can be phrased and efficiently handled through the UDE formalism and its tooling. We demonstrate the generality of the software tooling to handle stochasticity, delays, and implicit constraints. This funnels the wide variety of SciML applications into a core set of training mechanisms which are highly optimized, stabilized for stiff equations, and compatible with distributed parallelism and GPU accelerators. <<<